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Enacting Ecological and Collaborative Rationality through Multi-Party Collaboration

By Marie-France B. Turcotte, Ph.D.
Stewart R. Clegg, Ph.D.
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Abstract

This article presents the case study of a partnership between a metallurgy company and an NGO concerned with environmental protection. The partnership constituted an attempt to reconcile the firm's economic objectives with those of citizens who lived in the area on which it had an ecological impact. The NGO sought sustainable development that created profits and jobs while not producing dysfunctional and unsustainable ecological side effects. The partnership created an arena defined by norms of disinterested rationality in which shifting negotiations of legitimacy and changing circuits of power proved crucial to the determination of how they met and what they were able to do. These are the strategic positioning, learning, circuits of power, and translation of the global to the local that are constituted in the collaboration. Using these four key theoretical building blocks, the paper contributes to stakeholder theory, and more specifically to the literature on multi-stakeholder partnerships. The case makes an original contribution to institutional entrepreneurship theory by showing how formulations established by a global institution are renegotiated at the local level.

Key Words: Multi-stakeholder, environmental, sustainability, institutional theory, stakeholder theory, learning, partnership.

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Introduction

Since the industrial revolution, the consequences of economic activities on the environment have grown in number and importance. In the past, dysfunctional side-effects of industrial society were treated, typically, as externalities that were had to be endured, if not tolerated. Graphic descriptions of these can be found in Engels' (1844) account of the conditions of the working class in England, for instance, or in many novels by Charles Dickens. At best the state might ameliorate the dysfunctions. For instance, in the manufacturing and mining spheres there were the various Factory Acts that Marx (1976) discusses in *Capital*; in the agrarian sphere the effects of rural displacement as a result of enclosure of common lands and displacement of peasant and subsistence farming lead to many attempts to reform the Poor Laws, to deal with the problems of vagabondage that arose from the mobs of landless poor.

While by the mid 19th century the state played a role in seeking to reform dysfunctional effects, environmental awareness was also developing as a movement in civil society. Carl von Linné, the father of taxonomy and ecological science, introduced the notion of 'nature's economy', representing the first theory of interdependence among living creatures (Deléage 1991; Drouin 1992). In the 19th century, the first environmental organizations were founded to protect natural habitats and quality of life in inner cities (Deléage 1993; Grinder 1980; Velosi 1980). And by the 20th century, environmental awareness was increasingly integrated with the concept of sustainable development. The *Brundtland Report* was particularly successful in reaching business communities and emphasizing the interdependence (rather than the conflict) between economy and ecology.

Following the publication of the *Brundtland Report* many authors

in the field of management¹ and many corporate discourses² called for a reconciliation of the economy and civil society in terms of economic and ecological objectives, rather than seek *post hoc* state intervention. Emphasis began to shift towards more proactive approaches, leading to partnerships between businesses and NGOs working in environmental protection. It is in this context that coordination efforts previously called for in the *Brundtland Report* of 1987, through partnerships, multi-stakeholder forums, negotiations and collaborative planning, were also called for at the Earth Summit in 1992, and later, by numerous academics.³

Sustainable development leaves no illusions about the importance of developing multiparty collaborative structures to complement the power of competition. Research into emerging forms of collaboration and their influence on mainstream organizational thinking and practice is needed. (Roome 1998, 273)

The partnerships that were forged between environmentalist NGOs and businesses were not only the harbingers of a new paradigm shift with regard to the environment, but were also an index of change in the governance of businesses. Indeed, as Hoffman demonstrated (1999) in a study of the chemical industry, environmentalists became stalwart stakeholders in businesses in the 1990s, engaging them directly rather than mediating their relations through government bodies, as previously.

¹ See Schmidheiny 1992; Stead and Stead 1992; Cairncross 1992; Buchholz 1993; Collins 1995; Hart 1995; Porter and van der Linde 1995; Shrivastava 1995; Starik 1995; Starik and Rands 1995; Halme 1997.

² See Holcomb 1990; Davis 1991; Grant 1991; Newall 1991.

³ See Barouch 1989; Kellman 1992; Callon 1993; French 1995; Hoffman Gillepsie, Moore and Wade-Benzoni 1999; Long and Arnold 1995; Porter and Salvesen 1995; Healey 1997; Roome 1998.

Multi-stakeholder organization

Strategic positioning

Deciding where to be, what to do, and how to get there involves strategic positioning. While this can be a difficult exercise in a single organization it is even more complicated in a multi-party organization. In partnerships many promises are brought to the table, often presented as legitimate conflict-resolution mechanisms, as well as appropriate setting for learning and innovation. Some see these as forging a bright new joint future; others see only cases of co-optation (Banerjee 2006). In the best-case scenarios multi-party relations not only help solve meta-problems but also provide competitive advantages (Heugens, Van den Bosch & Van Riel, 2002, p.36).

Initially the literature concentrated mostly on the study of the multi-party process (e.g. Gray, 1985, 1989; Waddock, 1989; Gray and Wood, 1991; Wood and Gray, 1991; Huxham, 1991, 1993; Logsdon, 1991; Selsky, 1991; Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, 1994). Five elements were most commonly identified as factors contributing to success (Pasquero, 1991). The first one is that the MCP must follow well-established phases. The second and third success factors are concerned with the legitimacy of the participants and the recognition of their interdependency. Participants must acknowledge each others legitimacy and competence (Gray, 1985; Huxham; 1992). They must also realize that the problem forms an indivisible block, making it more advantageous to collaborate. The stakeholders committed to the debate must be identified and participate in the MCP. The fourth success factor is concerned with the participants' motives. They should be motivated both by a notion of 'public interest' and by the specific interests of the group they represent. Participants' expectations should be realistic (Huxham, 1991). The fifth success factor pertains to the implementation capability of the MCP. In other words, participants should be capable of implementing the decisions. Fournier (1986) noted that to be viable in the long run each party needed to obtain a minimum of

concrete results. Turcotte and Pasquero (2001), as well as Driscoll (2006), however, found that multi-stakeholder processes did not result in implementable decisions but more often 'polysemic' agreements and general principles.

Learning

Partnerships and collaborations with stakeholders are also described as sites of learning (e.g. Driscoll 1995, 1996; Roome 1998; Turcotte and Pasquero 2001; Heugens, Van den Bosch and van Riel, 2002; Turcotte & Dancause, 2003) and problem-solving (Pasquero, 1991; Hood, Logsdon, Thompson, 1993) because they bring together many perspectives within a framework of constructive confrontation (Brown 1991). Several types of learning have been distinguished as possible outcomes of collaborative initiatives: inspired by Argyris' (1976) typology, single and double loop learning have been distinguished (Turcotte and Pasquero, 2001) and put in parallel with exploitative and explorative learning (Roome and Wijen, 2005). Typically, such learning is more explorative and less exploitative (Turcotte & Pasquero, 2001; Turcotte & Dancause, 2002; Driscoll, 2006). However, many factors, including the structure of the collaborative initiative, might determine the potential for learning: Roome and Wijen (2005) found that open structures are conducive to explorative learning while the alignment of interest among participants and the formalization of routines are necessary for exploitative learning.

Circuits of power

In establishing any multi-party organization relations of power are unavoidable (Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips 2006). Who gets to be involved, with what rights and privileges, and what actions are legitimated, are crucial to these relations of power (Clegg 1989; Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips 2006). Suchman (1995) defined legitimacy as 'a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and

definitions' (p. 574)). These multi-stakeholder collaborations were designed to create within their boundaries Habermas' 'ideal speech situations' (Driscoll, 2006). In his *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas argued that 'a genuinely democratic sphere comes into being when the interactions are focused on issues of common concern to citizens, equally accessible to all those potentially affected by those issues, based on rational-critical deliberation, and subject to normative standards of evaluation' (Haas, 2004, p.179). The sincere participation of citizens within such democratic sphere is understood to be a privileged way to find solution to environmental and social problems (Skollerhorn, 1998).

Multi-stakeholder collaborative initiative are designed to be privileged moments of discourse where meta-norms and meta-solutions can be rationally discussed among all stakeholders (rule of inclusiveness), regardless of the power they possess, within a consensual-based decision-making process. As such, they are considered highly legitimate by sophisticated civil actors. Considering that the only norms that can be ethically legitimate are community based and consistent with universal hypernorms, Calton and Payne (2003) suggested that multi-stakeholder learning dialogues be used to address messy problems. Heugens et al. (2002: 52) proposed that multi-stakeholder network have a buffering effect and help establish civil legitimacy for participating business organizations.

Driscoll (2006) analysed the use of multi-stakeholder collaborative processes in the forest industry using Suchman's (1995) distinctions between pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy depends on whether an activity will benefit the evaluators. Moral legitimacy concerns whether the activity is the 'right thing to do' and can be based on four principles: consequential legitimacy (what is accomplished, effectiveness), procedural legitimacy (based on the procedure followed), structural legitimacy (focused on general features of organizations or systems), and personal legitimacy (resting on the charisma of leaders). As for cognitive legitimacy, it refers to taken for granted knowledge and representations and is the more

difficult to acquire, according to Suchman (1995). Driscoll (2006) saw in the use of multi-stakeholder initiative and other forms of stakeholders engagement a tactic of symbolic management based on procedural legitimacy to increase structural legitimacy (the current forestry system) but lacking consequential legitimacy (not having significant impact on the greening of the forestry practices). In short, despite being designed by their advocates as ideal speech situations multi-stakeholder collaborative processes have also been described by critics as just another legitimization device.

Translating the Global to the Local

Early studies in Organization and the Natural Environment (ONE) were characterized by an appeal to global ethical principles by which organizations *should* guide their ecological actions (Newton, 2002), partially in response to anthropocentrism (see: Commoner 1990). Approaches such as deep ecology, spiritual ecology, social ecology, and eco-feminism inspired the theoretical foundations of some pioneer ONE works in the 'radical environmentalism paradigm' (Egri and Pinfield 1996). Empirical examples of pro-active environmental practices in firms were extremely scarce (Fisher & Schot 1993), and theoretical and prescriptive approaches were more common (Lovio *et al.* 1997). Some civil society collaborations with business organizations were noted (Turcotte, 1995), while a few industries were opening up to environmental stakeholders (Hoffman, 1999). A 'reformist environmental paradigm' (Egri & Pinfield, 1996) emerged, presupposing conjoint economic development *and* ecological capacity-building. in which ecological interests could educate and guide business in smart win-win choices (Hart 1997; Hawken 1993; Hawken *et al.* 1999). However, this is a highly abstracted account; it is one that circulates in academic circles rather more than in practice. Following Czarniawska & Sevón (2006), we need to follow the ideas as they trickle down, percolate, and constitute local action nets, so we can see how the global only becomes so through action at the local level.

In conclusion, and stating the research objectives of this paper, we explore the ways in which strategic positioning, learning, circuits of power, and global-to-local translation function in the processual dynamics of multi-stakeholder relations.

Methods

Data Collection

In the tradition of inductive research (Strauss and Corbin 1999), we consider the legitimacy games linked with issues of process and aspirations for new knowledge (learning). The research strategy chosen for this project was that of an embedded case study, a form of case work that includes several units of analysis, all of which related to a larger whole (Yin, 1994). The partnership chosen for this study was a 'monitoring committee' for Magnola Metallurgy Inc. (MMI), a magnesium plant slated to be built in the Eastern Townships of Quebec, Canada. A committee was formed to provide citizens with an opportunity to monitor the environmental impacts that might result from the plant's activities. Data were gathered, mainly through document analysis, in-depth interviews and, to a limited extent, through participant observation techniques.

The primary source of data consisted of documentary evidence of the controversy generated by MMI's move to this region of Quebec, more particularly, from the *Comité de citoyens du projet Magnola* (CCPM), founded in 1999 to monitor the set-up and operations of the plant. The *Société d'aide au développement de la collectivité* (SADC) took the initiative in creating this citizen's committee to monitor the Magnola project. SADC is a local development organization working to address entrepreneurial, social and environmental concerns. The first members of the CCPM were recruited through an advertisement that appeared in a local paper. Initially five citizens joined the Committee on a voluntary basis, from various occupational backgrounds and with some prior experience of other round table or multiparty committees: two beekeepers, a teacher, a business executive

and a doctor. Other participants included a coordinator and some 'permanent guests' representing the SADC, the *Ministère de l'environnement*, *Régie régionale de la santé de l'Éstrie*, the regional county municipality of Asbestos and MMI. Data included official documents provided by the organizations involved in the controversy, obtained via the Internet, as well as press clippings. A complete list of documents is available from the first-named author.

A secondary source of data consisted of interviews with members of the CCPM. Respondents were first contacted by letter, explaining the research objectives and guaranteeing confidentiality. After meeting with the respondents at a Committee session, telephone interviews were conducted in May and June of 2001. Eight members of the CCPM were interviewed for a total of five hours. Respondents were representative of the full range of vested interests in this issue: citizens (4 respondents), the company (1 respondent), municipalities and regulating agencies (3 respondents from the public sector). The interviews, using a semi-structured questionnaire, included questions regarding the participation of the respondents' organizations on the Committee. They also probed respondents' perceptions of the Committee process and (especially) its outcomes. Interviews were tape recorded, then transcribed.

Participant observation in this case consisted of attending official meetings of the Committee's. During meetings, the researcher was introduced and briefly stated the purpose of the research project (understanding the processes, outcomes and limitations of a partnership between an NGO and a company). Subsequently, the researcher sat as a silent observer and took detailed notes on what was said and how participants interacted. Informal moments, such as breaks, allowed time for the researcher to discuss events with the participants personally.

Data analysis

Data analysis followed several steps. First, data were read

attentively and annotated with marginal comments (Miles and Huberman 1994). Second, these remarks were condensed into themes and then systematically categorized into files. Third, the files were broken down into tables, which served as the basis for the case write-up. In the fourth step, nine units of analysis, reflecting the major issues discussed among the participants, were established. These units included: confidence in the transparency of information; recurrent funding; the representative quality of committee members and their recruitment; the independence of the Committee; the redefinition of the Committee's operations; the power and influence of the Committee; supplementary tests; acceptable environmental toxicity levels; organochlorines and hexachlorobenzene. The description of these discussions within the CCPM and of the entire controversy surrounding the set-up and operations of MMI served as an analytical basis for the governance structure in this partnership.

Magnola

Establishing the Plant

Magnola Metallurgy Inc. (MMI) is a subsidiary of Noranda Magnesium. The magnesium plant, located in Danville (in the Eastern Townships of Quebec, Canada) required (and received) a government investment of 1.2 billion dollars. Noranda holds 80% of MMI shares while 20% are held by *Société générale de financement du Québec* (a Government of Quebec agency). The plant produced its first magnesium ingots in the fall of 2000 and, once it was operating at full capacity, the MMI plant was expected to become the world's largest supplier of magnesium, with a maximum projected output of 58,000 metric tonnes of magnesium annually. Automotive manufacturers are the principal consumers of magnesium, used in alloys to produce lightweight engine castings for vehicles.

Local authorities hoped Magnola would create 315 permanent jobs in a region devastated by closure of asbestos mines despite

the project being a risky venture, since it was the first plant to attempt to extract metal from serpentine tailings (asbestos mine tailing deposits), using a proprietary technology. The plant set out to produce magnesium metal (Mg) through the electrolysis of magnesium chloride ($MgCl_2$), extracted from the serpentine tailings ($3MgO \cdot 2SiO_2 \cdot 2H_2O$) along with anhydrous magnesia (MgO).

Objections to Magnola

In October and November 1997, Quebec's *Bureau d'audiences publiques sur l'environnement* (BAPE — the Government of Quebec's environmental hearings board), held hearings on MMI's project. On these occasions, several groups, including Green Peace, *Union Québécoise de Conservation de la Nature* (UQCN), and *Coalition pour un Magnola propre* (CPMP) argued against the project. as unacceptable so long as it involved a chlorine-based extraction process based on the electrolytic reduction of $MgCl_2$. Chlorine-based Mg production is known to generate and release organochlorines, including dioxins and furans. These substances are toxic, carcinogenic and bioaccumulative. Organochlorines can cause hormone-dependent cancers and are known endocrine disrupters. Toxic substances of this order mainly affect the reproductive, immune and nervous systems, by hormonally confusing molecules in certain cells of the body. All of the functions in an organism that are governed by hormones therefore become susceptible to disruption. Approximately one hundred countries had committed to eliminating and reducing dioxins, furans, hexachlorobenzene and PCBs under the Stockholm Convention, and 'when negotiations were completed Canada was the first to sign and ratify the new treaty in May 2001' (Government of Canada, 2006, p.9)⁴.

⁴ The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) will come into effect in May 2004, and Canada released its National Implementation Plan on due date in May 2006, after several multi-stakeholders consultations were held (Government of Canada, 2006).

On March 4th 1998, BAPE concluded that Magnola's project, as presented, failed to meet environmental norms, most notably because it would produce dioxins and furans. A series of recommendations were made for the project's improvement. BAPE's requests pertained not only to the problem of organochlorines but also to silica-iron tailing settling tanks, air emissions (conventional gases, green house gases and organochlorines), liquid waste and water supply, gas piping and impacts on the human environment. BAPE also recommended that MMI form a citizen relations committee and that this committee be provided with access to scientific experts from the government to 'provide impartial insight into the findings of environmental monitoring.'⁵

MMI's electrolytic magnesium extraction plant set up operations in 1999. Prior to this, earlier in 1999, *Coalition pour un Magnola propre* began analysis to establish baseline contamination levels before the plant started up operations. Samples from deer and small animals were taken within a 30 km radius of the plant and underwent several laboratory analyses. The cost of this analysis program came to \$150,000 and was funded through public donations. Meanwhile, the Government of Quebec authorized construction of the Magnola Metallurgy plant in April 1998, with no demand for non-chlorine-based processes. The Government told Magnola that, in a spirit of 'partnership' and of encouraging businesses to 'take responsibility' for their deeds, it was to oversee environmental monitoring⁷. Monitoring would consist of a battery of chemical and physical analyses to be conducted in a variety of settings, carried out by the Magnola laboratory, under an accreditation process intended to validate its monitoring efforts.

⁵ For comparison between the BAPE recommendations and the government decree, produced by *Coalition pour un Magnola propre* see www.magnola.wd1.net/Bilan/Comapro06BapeDecret.html.

⁷ Reply from the Environment Minister to the president of *Comité de citoyens du projet Magnola*. See <http://www.reseau-sadc.qc.ca/sbestos/demsuivi.htm>.

Many demonstrations against the construction and operation of the MMI plant occurred. Opponents accused the government of putting economic interests ahead of environmental protection. Petitions were signed, meetings with government bodies took place, information sessions were held, alarming articles published, rallies organized, and the region saw an increase in acts of civil disobedience. In May 1999, during an open-house day at the Magnola plant, and in June of 2000, during the official opening of MMI, the *Coalition pour un Magnola propre* organized demonstrations. During a demonstration that took place in May 2001, an activist from the *Comité de lutte contre les organochlorés* (CLO) resisted arrest and groups opposed to the project used his trial as a platform to raise public awareness regarding this issue, calling for MMI to shut down its operations⁸.

CCPM: A partnership project for environmental monitoring

The CCPM sought to establish itself as an obligatory passage point for environmental monitoring of the Magnola project. The CCPM's official mission can be summed up in five main points:⁶ (1) receive citizens' concerns; (2) receive reports from MMI; (3) consider and discuss any environmental, economic or social concern and, to this end, call upon the expertise of guests and consult with specialists to elucidate the Committee's work; (4) submit opinions and make recommendations on various aspects of MMI's activities and projects affecting the community and its living environment; (5) regularly inform the population of its work (in newspaper columns, public evening meetings, conferences, etc.). Overall, the CCPM had a strong commitment to rationality and rational debate rather than principled opposition irrespective of the evidence. Metaphorically speaking, the members perceived the Committee as a 'watchful eye,' a 'watch dog' on Magnola's deeds and decisions. The CCPM was regarded by its

⁸ In a ruling handed down 4 July 2003, the activist who pleaded that there was a "necessity" to intervene (given the magnitude of the danger presented by the plant's activities) was unconditionally discharged.

⁶ These points are presented on the CCPM Web site. See (<http://www.reseau-sadc.qc.ca/asbestos/comcitoy.htm>)

members as a 'credible, serious, very approachable group,' a 'medium of communication,' a 'transmission line between the company and the community' and a nexus of 'information empowerment.' Moreover, 'independence,' 'transparency' and a 'quest for the truth' became the CCPM's leitmotifs. Although not formally legitimated by either the Government or the firm, it sought to establish its legitimacy through its commitment to these practices, such that it would become an obligatory passage point in the circuits of power that flowed around the Magnola operation (Clegg 1989).

The First Leitmotif: Independence

The issue of independence came up in several ways. The first objective of the CCPM was to create a citizen's committee that would be autonomous with regard to the various levels of government, businesses and other committees and coalitions in the region. From the beginning, the *Comité de citoyens du projet Magnola* defined itself as an organization working 'independently' in collaboration with organizations, institutions and regional public authorities (e.g., *Ministère de l'environnement* [MENV], SADC, the *Centre local de développement*, community organisations and the municipalities) to foster 'sustainable development.' The *Comité de citoyens du projet Magnola* (CCPM) sought to distinguish itself from *Coalition pour un Magnola propre* (CPMP) in that its objective was to monitor plant operations with the goal of preventing any negative impacts on the population and the environment, through 'dialogue with the project proponent,'⁷ meaning it maintained ongoing discussions with MMI.

The Committee met on a monthly basis. Meetings took place at *SADC d'Asbestos* or at the Magnola plant. Voting members consisted solely of citizens. CCPM's Coordinator was on hand in the organization's offices one day per week for the Committee Secretariat. Magnola participated as a guest member at Committee meetings, where it could provide an overview of plant

⁷ Newsletter. *Le Comité des citoyens vous informe*. Vol.2, No.2, 2000.

operations and present results from environmental sample testing. Representatives from various levels of government also attended meetings as expert consultants or resource people and did not participate in votes on decisions. All of the 'guest members' were treated as resource people. As such, Magnola acted as an 'informer,' charged with the task of justifying all of the company's actions, past and present.

The categorization of members designating which members could vote (citizens only) and which could not (representatives of MMI, governmental bodies) was a subject of some debate within the Committee. Several non-voting members would have liked to exercise voting rights. For example, Magnola considered that this kind of committee should be co-chaired by the parties committed to the CCPM's mandate. However, the majority of members considered that restricting voting rights exclusively to citizens was necessary to preserve the Committee's independence in relation to Magnola and to the government. Significantly, despite the spirit of candour and cooperation that predominated among all Committee members, the abiding preoccupation with independence was a reflection of the CCPM's apprehensions concerning the *Ministère de l'environnement's* ability to control industry, and scepticism about industry's ability to self-regulate in its operations.

We have succeeded in preserving relative independence from the municipality, from industry, and from the *Ministère de l'environnement* in that it was really the citizens, a few citizens, who are on the Committee who have the right to vote, make decisions and take control. (Conversation with a respondent, June 2001)

There has to be someone who is relatively independent to monitor what is going on. We did not have boundless confidence in the MENV, its capacity to do that or in the industry to self-regulate in its operations. So ordinary people had to stick their noses in, ask questions and have things

explained to them. (Conversation with a respondent,
June 2001)

Independence had costs attached to it: in concrete terms, the question of independence came up in relation to financial considerations and, in general terms, with regard to resources. To achieve its objectives, the Committee undertook several activities, organizing technical visits to the plant (accompanied by experts), hosting talks by specialists,⁸ conducting various studies, producing a newsletter, and overseeing chemical and biological analyses. Although participation was voluntary, and notwithstanding the fact that some experts provided services free of charge, gathering, interpreting and disseminating information demanded considerable resources. Therefore, in January 1999, the CCPM approached MMI to provide it with \$100,000 in recurrent annual funding. The Committee members justified the amount based on the fact that Magnola's presence had made the CCPM's involvement in data analysis and interpretation a necessity. With regard to the Committee's recurrent funding, members deemed that it would be necessary for the CCPM to preserve its independence in relation to Magnola and that it should not have to be subjected to pressures regarding the renewal of funding. Magnola did not acquiesce to this demand, instead offering only a payment of \$10,000 for one year.

In 2001, the CCPM's revenues were \$35,000 — \$20,000 of which came from the city of Asbestos, \$10,000 from SADC (in services rendered), \$2,000 from the regional county municipality of Asbestos and \$3,000 from MMI. The CCPM considered these resources to be altogether insufficient, especially since it wished to carry out more of its own environmental monitoring activities to compare and verify monitoring its results with those of MMI. In a letter addressed by the CCPM to the Environment Minister in March of 2000, its evident discouragement with regard to the magnitude of the task at hand was obvious.

⁸ Consulted experts included engineers, toxicologists and immunotechnologists.

Without warning and against our will, we have inherited part of the very heavy responsibility that was shouldered, up until now, by our *Ministère* and for which you have not equipped us. We are taking on this responsibility for the moment to preserve our living environment. We are volunteering, despite [the negative impact it has on] our quality of life.⁹

The Second Leitmotif: Transparency

'Transparency' was perceived by Committee members as being one of the CCPM's 'strong points.' It was also seen as necessary to realizing the core duties of its mandate, namely, (1) informing the public, (2) monitoring Magnola's activities; (3) establishing high-quality environmental monitoring. The idea of transparency was integrally linked to the Committee's role as an instrument for communication. This role has two dimensions: the first being communication between the plant and the Committee, the second, communication between the CCPM and the population at large. In this regard, the metaphor of the Committee as 'transmission line' used by some of its members is an eloquent representation of its activities.

Communication with MMI was carried out in a constructive manner. In its meetings, a relaxed atmosphere of mutual trust predominated. Discussions were respectful. The tone of relations between those involved in the CCPM–MMI partnership was appreciated on both sides, as evidenced in the praise and congratulations expressed in correspondence between the two parties. Without a doubt, every person on the Committee gave the best of him or herself.

Committee members wanted Magnola to provide CCPM with all the information it needed to understand plant production processes and pollutant tests. MMI demonstrated a great deal of openness on this count. Committee members visited the plant on many occasions with engineers to better understand the

⁹See <http://www.reseau-sadc.qc.ca/asbestos/beginpro.htm>.

production process. Magola also provided numerous documents. Moreover, the Committee arranged for a mobile unit for air quality analysis to conduct a thorough sampling of the area surrounding the plant and compile an ambient air profile to increase monitoring and prevention activities, especially testing for the presence of organochlorines and other volatile organic components.

We visited the whole [production] process, the laboratories as well as cells, the electrolytic generator, the electrolytic chamber... we also went to see other businesses, so there are those points of collaboration. (Conversation with a respondent, June 2001)

The main achievement of the Committee was the logging of environmental monitoring in cooperation with the *Ministère de l'environnement* following the plant's set-up. Magnola had 6,000 to 8,000 tests to conduct each year at precise locations. The Committee's role was to monitor the implementation of this testing and to complete it, where necessary. It arranged with Magnola that the test report be a summary, easy to interpret and understand.

Magnola's openness was undoubtedly part of its sustainable development perspective. MMI had voluntarily joined the Responsible Care® initiative (ethics and codes of practice established by the Canadian Chemical Producers Association in 1985, with 150 practical requirements for chemical producers). Notwithstanding Magnola's theoretical principle of openness, the CCPM's presence brought considerable pressure to bear to ensure the application of this principle.¹⁰

CCPM's most visible form of communication with the population was the dissemination of information as part of their mandate. The Committee wrote newsletters to inform the population of its

¹⁰ A fuller set of transcript data is available in support of this position from the first-named author.

work. These newsletters were distributed to citizens of the regional county municipality through mailings or in local newspapers, and were posted on the Committee's Web site. The Committee's opinions were also quoted in the media, including the newspaper *Les Affaires*, the magazine *Actualité* and in other economic news sources in the province of Quebec. Some of the observations disseminated in the CCPM newsletter were also cited by groups opposing the project.

In a longer-term perspective, we have in common the ability to look at all the figures, the ability to judge the situation, and especially the ability to keep the population well informed. (Conversation with a respondent, June 2001)

Communication in the other direction (that is, public input to the CCPM) was problematic and more implicit. It was problematic in that the Committee had great difficulties recruiting citizens. Initially, only five citizens responded to the SADC's invitation to participate in the Committee, and in 2002, despite numerous invitations in local papers, the CCPM still had only eight voting members (citizens). There was an implicit communications link from the population to the CCPM through the influence of opposition groups who spoke out at BAPE public hearings. In fact, it is worth noting that most of the elements that the CCPM found to be problematic (e.g., organochlorines, vent pipes or the silica-iron tailing settling tanks) were also identified in the BAPE report.

The Third Leitmotif: A Quest for the Truth

According to the CCPM's President, the Committee sought to establish 'a fair, truthful, defensive and vigilant position, and do so with honesty.' With this goal in mind, the Committee had to be a site for learning. Several levels of learning were in order:

Knowledge of the issue, the project, products, manufacturing process, the effects of production, the impacts on air and soil, and power relations

between industry, the MENV and citizens.
(Conversation with a respondent, June 2001)

The Committee's activities contributed to enhancing environmental controls and therefore increasing data collection, which fostered knowledge acquisition regarding the impact of Magnola's operations on the environment. For example, the CCPM requested that air quality samples be taken using a mobile unit from the *Ministère de l'environnement* rather than only taking samples at set stations, as initially foreseen. In this way, the results would not be biased by the possibility that the sampling units had been placed in areas where emissions did not accumulate. The Committee proposed that supplementary tests be conducted in addition to Magnola's, such as tests on bioaccumulation and toxicology in various elements of the food chain. These tests measure various particularly sensitive biological indicators to ascertain the preliminary effects caused by a given source of pollution. Conventional and biological tests are therefore complementary. A protocol was therefore established to monitor potential estrogenic effects on a species of small fish (creek chub) very common to the region.¹¹ Together, these elements provide early indications of the potential negative effects of pollution generated by the plant. The CCPM also organized a scientific round table with several independent experts, which allowed it to expand its horizons.

¹¹ The disruption of the endocrine glands by organochlorine pollution can produce dysfunctions in the reproductive system, the immune system and more. Particular attention was devoted to the presence of a specific protein that appears in men's livers exposed to this kind of pollution and which induces estrogenic effects. Fish catches came from the 12 sample points, distributed around water bodies in the region, including the Burbank pond. These water bodies act as pollution catchers due to the effects of percolation. Moreover, the creek chub, which feeds on insects and various other living substances, was also subjected to bioamplification due to ambient pollution, according to the CCPM (2001).

The CCPM also contributed to setting up a long-term program of analysis to monitor the evolution or the stability of the concentration of various contaminants in the environment. The bioaccumulation of pollutants is a phenomenon that takes place over a prolonged period of time, meaning that it could take years to detect a problem based on the environmental indicators. According to the Committee, it was therefore essential to anticipate this problem rather than face an irreversible environmental problem. The CCPM recently established contacts with the Department of Environmental Sciences at *Université de Sherbrooke* with the goal of finding assistance in interpreting the results of their test, especially regarding possible environmental toxicity levels.

There was no test for bioaccumulation because there are toxins, dioxins, chlorobenzenes, these are things that you don't see, that have no odour, they are miniscule, very rare things that don't even add up to the equivalent of a pound of butter every year, except that 454 g of dioxine is enough to kill 19 million people. So this relationship is difficult for the public to see and bioaccumulation gets into the food chain. So we do tests, with *Union des Producteurs Agricoles*, we test cows and bees. It is our pressure [tactics] that got us those [tests] and we went even further and set up toxicology tests, using fish. Magnola is doing more than the government was forcing it to do, so it is getting into it as well. We would like to do more but we always want to see more... there were two ambient air testing stations, it increased to four. For us, that isn't enough yet, but we did double the numbers just the same and I am very proud of that. (Conversation with a respondent, June 2001)

The common goal is to be able to understand and judge for ourselves whether the future potential emissions from the plant will have an impact on the environment... the point we have in common is our

ability to look at all the figures to be able to judge the situation and, especially, to be able to inform the population. (Conversation with a respondent, June 2001)

Data collection was only one of the steps involved in the acquisition of new knowledge. The data had to be interpreted. But, as the participants on the Committee quickly realized, 'forming an opinion for oneself will not be so easy as the environmental monitoring activities to be carried out are many and complex' (CCPM Newsletter, April 2001). The task was all the more difficult since the acceptability model for the various toxic emissions established by government decree did not appear acceptable to the voting members of the Committee (the citizens), who, much as the groups opposing the project, considered that the decree was too lax, contravening the Stockholm Convention. However, in a balanced perspective the Committee observed that Magnola's stacks were 'not the only one to produce POPs' (persistent organic pollutants); other sources, such as the wood-burning stoves used by local citizens, also produced dioxins and furans.

Through the Committee we must develop knowledge based on very sound judgment and a perspective on things that I think it is fair since you succeed in striking a balance and not siding with one camp or the other. But that requires deep thought because it is easy to be swayed one way or the other. (Conversation with a respondent, June 2001)

The Committee wished to develop a balanced perspective. It sought to distinguish itself from other environmental groups concerned about MMI because it considered that these groups were too oppositional. The CCPM criticized them for pushing environmental issues too far to the fore without attempting to understand the company's actions. The quest for balance influenced the recruitment of members such that people who valued a rational and balanced approach were sought out. It is possible that this commitment to rationality contributed to the Committee's recruitment problems, since it is unquestionably

easier to mobilize people by making alarming statements than it is by requesting that they participate in rational thinking.

A press release issued in October 2002,¹² noted widespread uncertainty within the community. Although CCPM was grateful for MMI's efforts it thought that pollution problems could be improved by Magnola if it used new technology. Thus, the Committee aligned itself with activist groups in its position on organochlorines and risk analysis because experts could not predict how quickly substances would bioaccumulate nor at what level effects begin to appear, only that when effects appear the situation would already be irreversible. Prevention is the only defence. From the perspective of this analysis, MMI must considerably reduce the level of its emissions. In the long term, the only tenable position would be virtual elimination.¹⁵ CCPM took the position that respect for norms regarding the concentration of organochlorines in the ambient air instituted by the government did not provide for long-term protection and that MMI had to reduce its organochlorine emissions very quickly. 'The situation is not without hope' the CCPM indicated, since 'it is technologically possible to reduce emissions.' The press release did not specify whether reductions were possible with the chlorine-based process. However, it did add that MMI had already taken initiatives to correct the situation and that 'the Committee is of the opinion that these measures are adequate for the time being.' In sum, the CCPM took a stand on the unacceptable level of emissions while reiterating its desire to work in a collaborative relationship with the company.

In April 2003, MMI mothballed its magnesium production operations.¹⁶ The company explained that the plant was to be shut down for an indefinite period of time because market conditions would not allow for its viable operation. Indeed, increased production and the low cost of magnesium production

¹² See [http:// www.reseau-sadc.qc.ca/asbestos/com161002.htm](http://www.reseau-sadc.qc.ca/asbestos/com161002.htm).

¹⁵ See [http://: www.norandamagnesium.com](http://www.norandamagnesium.com).

¹⁶ See <http://www.norandamagnesium.com>.

in China caused prices to plunge.¹⁷ Economic considerations therefore seem to have taken precedence in the decision to cease operations. No doubt to reassure their investors, the competition viewed the plant shutdown as proof that Magnola's technology was at fault.

In my opinion if Noranda's technology had worked as originally stated they should have been able to compete in today's market. Magnola never achieved greater than a 60% operating efficiency and could not produce a consistent product. Therefore, they were not able to secure long-term contracts from the automotive die-casters necessary to sell their products at premium prices.... Magnola had access to free feedstock, the waste rock from the processing of asbestos, but the rock contained not only magnesium silicate but also extremely variable amounts of iron, copper, nickel, and boron, any one of which can create problems in the production of high grade magnesium, hence the 'free' feedstock had hidden costs.¹⁸

Discussion

Strategic Positioning

CCPM sought to establish itself as a collaborative and rational obligatory passage point for regulating Magnola's ecological impact: to what extent was it a mechanism for conflict resolution or co-optation? We noted that the partnership between MMI and CCPM only allowed for a partial resolution of conflicts. On the one hand, relations between CCPM and MMI were very harmonious and discussions took place in a highly respectful

¹⁷ See <http://www.Cnw.ca/releases/March2003/24/c3650.html>.

¹⁸ *The World's Lowest-Cost Perspective Magnesium Producer*. Interview with William B. Burton, President of Magnesium Alloy Corporation. See <http://www.magnesiumalloy.ca/report/0306-Worlds-Lowest-Cost-Prospective-Magnesium-Producer.pdf>.

atmosphere of trust for all involved. The partnership was an enclave where rational debates, with no political bias (towards the environment or economic profitability) took place, with the hope of reconciling positions in order to achieve sustainable development. The partnership was managed with particular care to obtain procedural legitimacy and the rules of decision-making were consensus-based. There were several public calls to involve participants, seeking for inclusiveness of stakeholders. However, there were exclusions resulting from the very objectives of the partnership. As a 'learning organization' the CCPM was engaging citizens in a collaborative relationship with MMI and governmental organizations. Yet, the CCPM also understood its mission to be a 'watch dog' on behalf of citizens, and consequently, the 'voting' members had to be citizens, thus excluding from the formal decision process representatives from the company and governmental organizations. Furthermore, the way the venue was framed, with insistence on rationality, collaboration, and reconciliation between economic and environmental objectives, had all the ingredients of a recipe to appeal to individuals with a reformist ideology among the environmental movement, which, *de facto* excluded citizens representing more 'radical' anti-business ideologies (Turcotte, 1995; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007).

While the reconciliation between environmental and economic objectives was attempted within the boundaries of CCPM, it was not achieved. In the end, a substantial dichotomy was revealed in the respective participants' objectives: even though CCPM still garnered hope that interests could be reconciled through a technical solution the priority was the environment. Consequently, CCPM aligned itself on many points with the more radical environmental groups, whereas for MMI (if we believe their press release explaining the reasons behind the plant shutdown), economic issues took precedence. Moreover, the existence of a partnership between CCPM and MMI did not reduce the turbulence and manifestations of conflict with other environmentalist groups, who opposed MMI's activities. Certainly, many efforts were made to foster harmonious relations and, to paraphrase Poncelet (2001), we can say that we were

able to observe 'a kiss here and a kiss there.' However, contrary to what Poncelet was suggesting, the collaborative approach did not involve complacency in the case of the CCPM–MMI partnership, but did allow for constructive confrontation. The CCPM neither allowed Magnola to coopt opposition nor did CCPM become merely a conduit for MMI's interests to be promoted.

Heugens et al. (2002) propose that the creation of stakeholder integration structures – such as the CCPM – leads to the establishment of sociopolitical legitimacy on behalf of the organization as perceived by stakeholders. The results of the case suggests that procedural legitimacy was granted only temporarily and only by already supportive stakeholders – by governmental organizations, promoters of economic development and a few cooperative citizens, but not by a large number of citizens with radical views on the project, nor by most media. MMI remained more controversial than legitimate. While it is tempting to propose that the creation of stakeholder structures with radical groups (rather than reformist ones) might lead to the establishment of socio-political legitimacy of the organization, it might not be possible to get these groups on board, as they often challenge the structural legitimacy of the businesses and because their identity is formed around protesting rather than collaborating. Even were they to accept the invitation, they would ask for radical changes, representing substantial challenges for companies.

Although the CCPM commitment to rationality was indubitable its resources for achieving rationality were extremely limited. Good science is not cheap and CCPM could hardly afford to engage in sufficient science to be rationally persuasive. Furthermore, good and sound science is often not enough to resolve complex issues and trans-scientific problems (Weinberg, 1972). More often than not, as we shall see, it provides occasion for those who can afford it to stall. The CCPM did not allow – nor attempt – to bring about technological innovation in order to eliminate or reduce the production of organochlorides as a by-product of the plants' activities. The production technique remained locked-in by the

sunk costs of the newly installed equipment. No radical innovation occurred in this regard.

Learning

CCPM's research requested the development of new pollution measures within the realm of risk management, single-loop learning for the company. The Committee participants wanted the partnership to be a site for learning, an enclave of apolitical rationality that could allow them to understand the real impact of the company's activities on the environment. By focusing on this objective and deploying consensual efforts to reach it, the CCPM became a 'learning organization.' Thus, the case supports Heugens et al's. (2002) proposition that stakeholder integration structures targeting meta-problem solving result in learning effects between organizations and their stakeholders.

If learning was incremental (no revolution in the production process or design), it would be concrete and implementable for MMI as an exploitative opportunity. Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) as well as Driscoll (2006) found that decisions coming from multi-stakeholder processes are seldom implementable. As this case appears different, it is worth exploring the conditions that might explain such a result. The CCPM was translating environmental concerns that included the more radical environmental movement, making them more accessible to the company. CCPM was perceived by its members as a 'transmission line' and a place of 'rationality,' in a tacit communality with the company's vantage point. The CCPM could be described as a reformist group and its members shared MMI's enthusiasm for the potential of technical innovations to solve environmental issues. Therefore, CCPM's alignment with Magnola's organizational culture contributed to exploitative learning about new pollution control routines that could be implemented by the company. The CCPM was culturally closer to the MMI than more radical groups, supporting the proposition by Roome and Wijen, (2005) that the less there is diversity and the more there is alignment of interests among the participants, the

more likely it is that exploitative learning can result from a multi-stakeholder partnership. It also supports Turcotte and Pasquero's (2001) model of an inverse relation between the diversity of the participants and the tractability (or implementability) of the solutions.

How did the CCPM become a learning organization? The Committee played a remarkable role in the mobilization of resources to measure the company's environmental impact. CCPM rallied government agencies, experts from various universities and laboratories, the *Union des producteurs agricoles*, and (of course) MMI lab experts, with whom it maintained a privileged dialogue. It created a sphere of disinterested rationality which did become a significant circuit in the flows of power relations around Magnola, with regard to its ecological responsibilities. CCPM was creative in using its commitment to rationality to afford leverage on MMI. The will of CCPM's participants to collaborate with each other in a spirit of reconciliation, as people of good faith, was very real. However, in the end, its rational approach did not diminish the complexity of the issues at hand. The wished-for reconciliation was achieved only temporarily over the polysemy of the 'precaution' concept, which was taken as a synonym for-management and pollution measurement. Faced with intractable uncertainty, CCPM fell back on larger principles — the principles of precaution, which had a radical meaning for some, while for others it signified the priority of economic imperatives.

The CCPM was very active as a learning organization in rallying several stakeholders to understand the environmental impacts of the company's activities and to impose new pollution control measurements. As such, the CCPM acted as an institutional entrepreneur strategically positioned at the local level, piercing at the organizational frontier with arguments of groups with more radical ideologies protesting and producing 'symbolic damage' (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). As a 'watch dog', the CCPM also sought support from the new norms established by an international institution – the agreed but not yet ratified Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.

According to Maguire and Hardy (2006) at the end of the multi-stakeholder debates that lead to the Stockholm Convention, 'science was subordinated to precaution' (p. 14), thus altering the power relationships and representing a political gain for the environmental movement. Indeed, the discourse of sound science coupled with risk management allows entrepreneurs to be entrepreneurial – to take risks – while the discourse of precaution empowers governments and NGOs to act against these risks. As Maguire and Hardy (2006, p.16) argue 'Sound science positions governments as reactive, marginalizes NGOs, and gives business more latitude to develop and continue to sell risky products until their harm is unequivocally established.' Risk management doctrines support such action because, until (a lengthy) time has elapsed while the scientific research is done the business can indubitably make profits even while it is not clear what the side-effects of these profits are or will be.

Circuits of Power

The state was a shareholder in MMI. The partnership was instigated through a para-governmental organization, SADC. The CCPM had, therefore, implicitly received governmental mandate for steering MMI's environmental impacts yet it was hardly resourced adequately. The members of CCPM found their mandate difficult to despatch because, as they lamented, they did not have the means necessary to fulfil it. Consequently, CCPM called upon the government to pass more severe regulations and appealed to MMI for recurrent funding — a form of 'taxation', in the respondents' own words. However, the collaborative ecological monitoring partnership proved to be no substitute for state intervention, (since CCPM's means were by no means equal to those of the state), although the partnership did contribute to the governance of the company, by being both its 'watch-dog' and its companion in learning.

The CCPM created, imposed and managed circuits of power new to MMI, in a context where the legitimacy of both the company as a responsible corporate citizen and of the provincial government

as a reliable guardian of public health and environment had been threatened. In fact, following Driscoll's (2006) critical analysis of the use of multi-stakeholder collaborations in the forest industry, we can see the instigation of the CCPM by a para-governmental organization involved in regional development as a form of symbolic management, an attempt at substituting one form of procedural legitimacy (the CCPM as a citizen-led ideal-speech situation with a legitimate meta-objective – sustainable development) for the missing procedural legitimacy (the decree that the government had to pass to allow for the installation of MMI). In this instance, despite the entrenched local opposition to MMI and the rational marshalling of evidence by CCPM it was the rationality of neither of these which defeated the diffusion of organochlorides but the rationality of the market. The CCPM did create circuits of power, but weak ones.

Indeed, CCPM circuits appear particularly weak when compared by those put in place by MMI to support its entrepreneurial venture in Magnola. The MMI plant was based on a new technology, which involved several risks, not only in terms of environmental impact but also, as it turned out, in terms of efficiency and markets. As an entrepreneur, MMI was particularly successful in finding allies, especially among the provincial and local governments, using arguments of moral consequential legitimacy. Not only would MMI contribute to local economic development – jobs creation – but it would also solve an environmental problem by recycling the asbestos mine tailing deposits (industrial wastes). There were concerns about the health and environmental impacts of the by-products but these impacts had not been scientifically proven yet and a risk management process was to be put in place under the supervision of willing citizens through the CCPM, which represented an attempt at gaining procedural legitimacy using both the ideal of science and the ideal speech situation – the old and the new paradigms. In the legitimacy game, it is to be expected that players use all the arguments available within their cognitive framework to configure and reconfigure their circuits of power in their best advantages. The arguments circulate and are effective within some networks (circuits), but they will be rejected

among others. In a multi-stakeholder field with a lot of diversity in the perspectives of actors, a way to be convincing might be to pool arguments from different camps, such as associating the science of pollution measurement with the precautionary principle.

Despite the CCPM protagonists' respect for the rationality of rationality, the partnership proved to be a very 'amodern' story (Latour 1991) in which politics, economics and technical issues were conflated and resisted any attempt at separation into distinct camps. 'Knowledge,' in such a context, appears as a construct in constant evolution, subject to controversy and subjugated to uncertainties, an emergent property of the rationalities in play. By the same token, cognitive legitimacy is difficult to maintain when episodes of de-institutionalisation of these knowledge occur. It is typical of messy problems and controversy that new elements and actors (human and non humans) tend to emerge and change the configuration of the field, both from a technical and institutional point of view.

Translating the Global to the Local

Following Czarniawska & Sevón (2006), global ideas always have to be locally translated. At the international level, global NGOs were very active in drafting the Stockholm Convention, bringing about new institutional norms, including the primacy of the precaution principle (Maguire and Hardy, 2006). At the local level, NGOs and citizens with radical views on MMI were also very active in the de-institutionalisation of the company on the base of these new global norms: images of people marching on the street and getting arrested for their conviction presented their case televisually. Within the CCPM, citizens with a reformist view on MMI's project attempted the re-institutionalisation of the company by entering a dialogue around a theme set by the company – risk management in the context of sound science – to conclude, finally, the need for a more radical meaning of precaution (avoiding the production of organochlorides), in a spirit of 'radical reformism' (Orsato, Clegg, 2005)

Although the partnership had been designed as an enclave for rational dialogue, its frontiers were porous. Furthermore, external rationalities – that of the market, of international institutions, of the technology, and of various international and local stakeholders – interpellated this space of ideal speech. At the same time, establishing the partnership was an attempt by actors to maintain legitimacy and establish *their* circuits of power.

Concluding remarks

The paper has presented an in-depth case study of a partnership established between a mining company and citizens concerned about health and environmental issues. It has explored the propositions from the multi-stakeholder theory concerning both learning and legitimacy. To better understand the phenomenon, the analysis has borrowed from several theoretical fields. It has borrowed typologies of learning from organizational learning to distinguish explorative from exploitative learning (March, 1991) and single-loop learning from double-loop learning (Argyris, 1976). It applied a typology of legitimacy distinguishing pragmatic legitimacy from several types of moral legitimacy and from structural legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) and has also borrowed from institutional entrepreneurship the role of discursive debates in the setting of new norms (Maguire and Hardy, 2006). From power and actor-network theory it has deployed a framework to analyse the interactions among actors (humans and non-humans) and networks, as well as their attempt to configure new circuits of power and reconfigure existing ones (Clegg, 1989), in the translation of the global to the local (Czarniawska & Sevón 2006),.

The main contribution is to stakeholder theory and, more specifically, the understanding of how and under which conditions multi-stakeholder partnerships can benefit business organizations and the societal environment. The case supported previous propositions that multi-stakeholder partnerships are

conducive to learning.¹³ The case also allows us to specify the conditions and types of learning to be expected. Turcotte and Pasquero (2001), as well as Driscoll (2006), observed explorative learning but no exploitative learning in situations where multi-stakeholder dialogues also included representatives of the environmental movement with more radical views. Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) proposed a model where the diversity of the participants was inversely related to the potential for exploitative learning and positively related to the potential for explorative learning. Roome and Wijen (2005), as well as Turcotte and Dancause (2003.), in comparative case studies, found that the structure of the multi-stakeholder partnership would indeed influence the types of learning to be expected, and that the alignment of interests (in other words the reduction of diversity) was conducive to exploitative learning. The present case study contributes to the evidence supporting these more specific propositions. Furthermore, the results have shown the limited scope of the exploitative learning and organizational change that were brought about and that should be expected. The partnership allowed the development of technical innovations and incremental change in the organizational routines of the company. One might wonder if the partnership might have allowed for double-loop learning when the citizens' group partner developed a more 'radical' definition of the precautionary principle. It will be for further research to assess if and under which conditions representatives of radical perspectives might allow for double-loop learning and radical change.

The case also contributes to institutional theory. It illustrates how legitimacy is neither an outside nor static institutional feature but rather resembles a kaleidoscope of perceptions defined, temporarily granted, and redefined, through discursive interactions in a polyphonic context. In such a context, moral arguments are confronted with other moral arguments while actors are very active in redefining knowledge and cognitive

¹³ Pasquero, 1991; Hood, Logsdon, Thompson, 1993 ; Driscoll 1995, 1996; Roome 1998; Turcotte and Pasquero 2001; Heugens, Van den Bosch and van Riel, 2002

frameworks. As knowledge construction and legitimacy building are so closely related, it is thus not surprising that attempts at learning and innovating might sometime appear to some critics as merely symbolic management. Thus, the case offers evidence supporting a growing trend which focuses on change and institutionalisation processes by introducing constructionism and discourse analysis into institutional theory (Orsato et al. 2002; Phillips, N., Lawrence, T.B., Hardy, C. 2004; Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2006; Maguire and Hardy, 2006). The case also suggests reconnecting institutional theory with a concern for power. Not all circuits of power are equal in their influence, as the CCPM case has shown. Nevertheless, apparently less powerful actors (in the CCPM case a small groups of citizens that took over a reformist project) can gain influence by mobilizing discourses and, while becoming convincing agent of learning, in other words institutional entrepreneurs, aim to redefine cognitive legitimacy. Indeed, the case study has shown how the partnership could become a learning organization and a companion in learning to a business organization. It did so by acting as an entrepreneur in mobilizing resources, persons, departments, organizations and discourse. It created a sphere of disinterested rationality which in itself acted as legitimacy for developing a network of allies enrolled into their project for knowledge development.

The case also makes an original contribution in showing how discourse established by a global institution is activated at the local level. Far from a functionalist vision of a transmission line going from global to local, it shows that there is renegotiation at every step. Indeed, the same discursive tensions among 'sound science' and 'precaution' that were constitutive of the Stockholm Convention (Maguire and Hardy, 2006) were renegotiated again at the local level. The text of the Convention became one more reference each of the actors translated and redefined to support their views of the project. The text of the Convention became an obligatory reference point for the actors involved in this local debate, but one referred to in polymorphic ways, opening a new negotiation process over its meaning at the local level. All these negotiation moments are part of the change process.

Practical recommendations can be formulated for the convenors of multi-stakeholders partnerships, for activist groups and for firms. For convenors of multi-stakeholder initiatives, one recommendation is to understand the objectives of the partnership and structure it consequently, knowing that the degree of diversity among participants (their ideological positions, their interests) will influence the type of learning expected (explorative or exploitative). Another implication would concern power and its perception. Although it would be naïve to think that the relative power and access to resources of the actors involved has no influence in the context of these quasi ideal speech situation, nevertheless the aura of the ideal speech situation and the devotion to rationality does offer a context conducive to learning and innovation by creating opportunity for building a learning network. For activist groups, an important implication regards the potential consequences of participating or not participating to partnerships with business organizations and other forms of multi-stakeholder initiatives. Radical groups often interpret participation in such initiatives as a form of co-optation that could only undeservedly contribute to legitimate business as usual. However, it might be worth taking the risk to collaborate in order to co-opt the business organization and attempt being a companion to radical change, while it would always be possible to fall back to a contestation position if this does not work. As the case shows, precautions can be taken so as to avoid losing autonomy. Groups with reformist positions are often solicited to participate in such partnership, to such an extent that it becomes very intensive in terms of resource and time consumption. They have to evaluate the opportunity to participate in view of their potential to influence learning and cognitive legitimacy toward their ideal. For firms, one general recommendation would be to instigate such partnership upstream, before controversies, as a device with which to understand emerging norms better within their institutional environments and to maximize learning. Another lesson for firms is that procedural legitimacy is granted quite temporarily and cannot in the long term replace other forms of moral legitimacy.

The limitations of these findings are linked with those generally associated with case studies. Case studies allow for in depth understanding of the phenomenon at hand and are recognized to offer high internal validity, yet how much can be generalized from one or a few cases? In such context, the transferability of the knowledge produced depends on the level of detail provided about the method and about the case itself (Contandriopoulos, 1990), to see to what extent the situation described is sufficiently similar to inform other situations and to translate into useful insights for these (Latour, 1991, 1992). Although we recognise the exploratory nature of this work, we attempted to relate the results with other comparable case studies of multi-stakeholder collaborations; thus, we contributed by testing propositions found in this literature.

It is useful to borrow from several theoretical developments to understand better a phenomenon as we have done. While the multiplicity of theoretical frameworks increases fidelity (Miles and Huberman, 1994) it multiplies the number of avenues for theoretical development. In this case the combination of several theoretical perspectives inform each other; particularly, by exposing links between learning (knowledge development) and legitimacy building we have integrated two previously opposed perspectives in the study of multi-stakeholder collaboration and stakeholder theory. By the same token, the case contributes to understanding how institutionalisation processes occur at the local level.

One potentially fruitful avenue for future research would be to analyse more systematically how new norms developed by global institutions are negotiated at the local level. Another issue would be to understand the complementarity of roles between organizations with radical and reformist perspectives within the social and environmental movement.

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